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abstract: In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that 
some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable 
for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features . In this paper, I will, first, 
show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as prob-
lematic on both available readings . Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas 
to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument . Szanto 
emphatically contrasts the Husserlian, constitutive conception of intentionality with 
the mainstream, representational conception . If we interpret Siewert’s ideas in repre-
sentational terms, it will be possible to add to my critical objections . However, I will 
suggest that it is also possible to interpret, or perhaps to modify, Siewert’s views in 
Husserlian constitutive terms, thereby addressing the objections raised in the present 
paper .
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I
In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that 
some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are 
assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features . In this 
paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambigua-
tion, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings . Second, I 
will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of 
the difficulties with Siewert’s argument . Szanto emphatically contrasts the 
Husserlian, constitutive conception of intentionality with the mainstream, 
representational conception . If we interpret Siewert’s ideas in representational 
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terms, it will be possible to add to my critical objections . However, I will sug-
gest that it is also possible to interpret, or perhaps to modify, Siewert’s views 
in Husserlian constitutive terms, thereby addressing the objections raised in 
the present paper .
When Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are inten-
tional features, this identity claim can be read in two ways . On the first reading, 
some phenomenal features of the subjects of visual experience are intentional 
features . Here, a phenomenal feature is one’s being in a mental state with a 
phenomenal character, and an intentional feature is one’s being in a mental 
state with intentional content (or intentional character) .1 On the second read-
ing, some phenomenal features of visual experiences are intentional features . 
Here, the phenomenal features are the phenomenal characters of the visual ex-
periences, and the intentional features are their intentional contents . The first 
reading is the weaker, being closely associated with the idea that our visual ex-
periences have both intentional content and phenomenal character, and there 
is a close connection between the two, viz ., a supervenience or dependence 
relation . The second reading is the stronger, requiring that visual experiences 
have phenomenal characters which are identical with their contents .
I will highlight this ambiguity, because it seems to compromise Siewert’s 
argument, and Siewert’s views are an important contribution to the ongoing 
debates about the relation between consciousness and intentionality . In these 
debates, the relevant notion of consciousness is usually explicated as what 
it is like for a subject to have a certain mental state, while intentionality is 
generally understood as a mental state’s or linguistic expression’s being about, 
or being directed to, some object or state of affairs . There has been a recent 
surge in views, according to which we have “phenomenal intentionality”, i .e ., 
a kind of intentionality that is necessarily conscious, and that we have “in 
virtue of” being conscious . Siewert’s views are an early contribution to this 
line of thinking, and have not lost their relevance today .2
1 I use “intentional character” as an alternative to the perhaps more theoretically loaded 
“content” .
2 For a recent collection of papers on phenomenal intentionality, see Kriegel (2013) . For 
an overview of the issues, see Kriegel (2013: Ch . 1) . Several papers on Siewert’s The Signifi-
cance of Consciousness, with Siewert’s responses, can be found in Psyche, 7 (2001) and 8 (2002), 
available at http://www .theassc .org/journal_psyche .
Terence Horgan and John Tienson refer to Siewert’s views in endnotes 15, 16, and 22, to 
section 3 of their seminal paper “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenol-
ogy of Intentionality” (Horgan and Tienson 2002: 524–526) . In their recent critique of Hor-
gan and Tienson’s paper, Andrew Bailey and Bradley Richards allege that Horgan and Tienson 
have, in fact, provided no arguments to the effect that the content of perceptual experiences 
is in some way dependent on their phenomenal nature, and “provide no guidance as to where 
such reasons might be sought” (Bailey and Richards 2014: 317) . This is somewhat uncharita-
ble, since, in endnote 15, Horgan and Tienson speak of Siewert’s discussion, in Siewert (1998: 
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However, I will also argue that Siewert’s argument runs into difficul-
ties even on the first reading, viz ., not arguing for the outright identity of 
the phenomenal and intentional characters . I will be painting in very broad 
brush strokes, aiming to promote a dialogue between contemporary philoso-
phy of mind and Husserlian phenomenology . I am, of course, not alone in 
considering these issues with such aims in mind . Aspects of the conscious-
ness-intentionality debate have already been discussed from the point of view 
of Husserlian phenomenology, with Thomas Szanto’s monograph being an 
outstanding recent contribution .3 Szanto distinguishes the Husserlian view 
of intentionality from what he calls the representational, or referential, view . 
According to the latter view, conceived in very general terms, mental states 
are intentional in the sense that they are directed to, or related to, external 
objects . On the Husserlian view, by contrast, intentionality is not conceived 
in terms of representing, or referring to, external objects . neither are the ob-
jects internal to consciousness . Rather, objectivity, in the sense of presence, is 
constituted within consciousness, a process that is rightly conceived without 
recourse to an external object, or a thing in itself, except as a principle that 
guides the process, akin to a Kantian regulative idea .4 We conceive of the 
presence of the object in terms of a kind of harmonious series of appearances, 
or experiences, with the idea of an object depending on our sense that the 
harmonious series could, in principle, be pursued infinitely, without a rup-
ture or a breakdown .
This is a familiar understanding of the Husserlian view . However, it is 
important that Szanto has contrasted it with the prevalent approaches in the 
analytic philosophy of mind, made his point with due emphasis and dis-
cussed its various implications . I shall therefore draw upon his work in the 
present paper . The scope of my discussion will be limited to the topic of per-
ceptual experiences; I will set aside issues pertaining to the putative “cognitive 
phenomenology” of judgment and thought .
II
In this section of my paper I propose, first, to present Siewert’s argument and 
clarify some of its central aspects, second, to discuss what I take to be an am-
Ch . 7 and 8), as “complementary” to theirs, and thus seem to regard themselves as dividing 
philosophical labor with Siewert – an indication of which Bailey and Richards do not seem to 
have taken notice . 
3 niels Weidtmann, too, has contributed to the debate, viz ., as, in his paper, he provides 
an overview of the argument of Horgan and Tienson (2002), and argues that Husserl’s view is 
significantly different from Horgan and Tienson’s (Weidtmann 2010: 97–102, especially 102) . 
Szanto’s account of Husserl’s view seems in basic agreement with Weidtmann’s . 
4 For a contrast of the two kinds of views, see Szanto (2012: 45–46) .
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biguity in the argument, and, third, to offer criticisms of the disambiguated 
versions of the argument .
I will begin by presenting what, based on chapters 6 and 7 in Siewert’s 
book, I take to be an adequate reconstruction of Siewert’s argument .
(1) If we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of phenomenal features, 
then these phenomenal features are intentional features .
(2) We are, indeed, assessable for accuracy in virtue of phenomenal fea-
tures .
(3) Therefore, these phenomenal features are intentional features .
Let us take a closer look at the pivotal phrase “in virtue of” . Siewert 
introduces it to highlight the contrast between the way linguistic utterances 
and perceptual experiences are assessable for accuracy (Siewert 1998: 190) . 
Uttering “u” is a feature “with respect to” which we are assessable for accuracy, 
provided that “u” is supplied with an interpretation . Siewert argues that no 
such interpretation is needed in the case of beliefs or perceptual experiences . 
He makes this view precise as follows,
[A] feature is one in virtue of which its possessor is assessable for truth or ac-
curacy just in case: from the possession of that feature it follows that there is 
some condition, the satisfaction of which, together with one’s possession of that 
feature, entails some correlative assessment for truth or accuracy, though that 
condition need not include anything we can rightfully count as an interpreta-
tion of that feature . To put this a bit more precisely, we might say that a state-
ment S of the form ” .  .  . x  .  .  . F  .  .  .” is the attribution to x of an intentional 
feature, when the following holds . If S is true, then it follows that there is some 
condition C, such that, first, if S is true and C obtains, then either: what x F’s is 
true (or false); or x F’s truly (or falsely); or x F’s accurately (or inaccurately); or 
the way it F’s to x is accurate (or inaccurate) . And second, it is not the case that 
C’s obtaining furnishes the feature attributed to x in S with an interpretation 
(Ibid .: 192) .
notice that the idea of assessability for accuracy, in virtue of a certain feature, 
is here conceived in negative terms, viz ., the relevant feature is such that it 
renders the subject assessable for accuracy without the feature’s needing to be 
interpreted . Siewert does not give a positive account of “in virtue of” . As for 
the ideas of interpretation, and “interpreting conditions”, Siewert does not 
provide a definition in general terms, but invites the reader to accept these 
ideas on an intuitive basis, viz ., by consulting their sense of the differences 
between a linguistic utterance, on one hand, and assertion, belief, and vision, 
on the other (Ibid .) .
Such assessability for accuracy, as can be seen from the above block quo-
tation, is regarded by Siewert as a sufficient condition for a feature’s being an 
intentional feature . In fact, Siewert never develops a more detailed view of 
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intentionality in his book, so as not to make “too many initial assumptions 
about the philosophical questions and disputes surrounding it”, and so as not 
to get bogged down in theoretical discussions over technicalities (Ibid .: 188) . 
He avoids talk of “content”,
[W]e possess too little pretheoretical notion of what “content” is supposed to 
be that is clearly broad enough to give us a useful means of characterizing in-
tentionality, and the notion of content is so much shaped by its use in theories 
devoted to obscure issues we oughtn’t to prejudge, that it does not serve as a 
helpful starting point (Ibid .: 188–189) .
With these clarifications in mind, let us put a stamp of legitimacy on 
the reconstruction we began with . It clearly captures the content of the fol-
lowing statement of Siewert’s, expressing his view regarding the case of the 
phenomenal feature of its looking to one as if there is something X-shaped 
in a certain position,
[I]f it seems to you as it does for it to look this way, then, if it is also the case 
that there is something X-shaped in a certain position, it follows that the way it 
looks to you is accurate . That this follows is enough … to make the phenom-
enal feature in question an intentional feature (Ibid .: 221) .
Let us move on . Until now, our discussion has not taken up Siewert’s no-
tion of a phenomenal feature, allowing the reader to assume, based on what 
was said in the introduction, that it may, in some way, be regarded in terms 
of what it is like to be in a mental state . However, rather than merely taking 
over the phrase “what it is like” from other philosophers’ discussions, Siewert, 
in chapter 7, explains that, “[t]he phenomenal character of vision is how it 
seems for it to look some way to someone”, and also expresses the view that 
differences in phenomenal character can be known with “first-person war-
rant” (Ibid .: 219) .
I believe that Siewert’s use of the phrases “phenomenal feature” and “in-
tentional feature” is ambiguous, along the lines of the two readings that I have 
sketched in the introduction, and that this needs to be taken into account in 
critically assessing Siewert’s argument . On the first reading, some phenomenal 
features of the subjects of visual experience are intentional features . On the 
second reading, some phenomenal features of visual experiences are intentional 
features, i .e ., phenomenal characters of visual experiences are identical with 
their intentional characters .
In the context of Siewert’s argument, the uses of “phenomenal feature” 
and “intentional feature” need to correlate with each other . He, however, 
uses these terms variously . On one hand, in some passages, the relevant in-
tentional features are regarded beside features of being in mental states like 
meaning something or believing something (Ibid .: 192) . Elsewhere, however, 
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he indicates that the phenomenal features he has in mind are those of having 
a certain phenomenal character (Ibid .: 219), and, more particularly, that such 
are the phenomenal features that he believes to be assessable for accuracy and 
therefore to be intentional features (Ibid .: 221–222) .
These observations are relevant to understanding and assessing Siewert’s 
argument, insofar as the first reading yields the weaker conclusion, viz ., some 
version of the idea that our visual experiences involve both phenomenal char-
acters and intentional characters that are closely interconnected, and the sec-
ond reading, the stronger conclusion, viz ., (some) phenomenal characters are 
identical with intentional characters . Basically, if we adopt the first reading, 
the argument will need to prevail against the idea that visual experiences are 
not intrinsically intentional, but require an extrinsic interpretation, a judg-
ment that confers intentionality upon them . If we adopt the second reading, 
we will need to provide reasons for the identity claim to be accepted over any 
alternative views on which visual experiences’ phenomenal and intentional 
characters are distinct .
It seems to me that, insofar as Siewert puts forward explicit arguments 
for his view, he argues for the stronger claim (based on the second reading) 
by deploying arguments that, if successful, would support the weaker claim 
(based on the first reading) . The following illustrates this: “[T]here is just no 
such job [of interpretation] that needs doing . The phenomenal character of 
visual experience does not need to be supplied with intentionality by adding 
interpreting conditions, because it already has intentionality,” he claims, then 
adding that, on the contrary view, “visual phenomenal features would be, in 
a fashion, assimilated to linguistic utterances” (Ibid .: 222) . Yet, surely, they 
would not be like linguistic utterances if we granted that they had intentional 
content that was intrinsic to them, but distinct from their phenomenal char-
acter .
In the present treatment, we will set aside many of the details of Siewert’s 
arguments . Let it be noted that, in chapter 7, he provides extensive arguments 
to the effect that we cannot “take the intentional out of the phenomenal” 
(Ibid .: 217) . In effect, this means arguing for the claim that the intentional 
supervenes on the phenomenal, notably, by arguing against the notion of 
sense data, and by considering different versions of the view that a judgment 
is needed to invest visual experiences with intentionality (Ibid .: 234–241) . 
As far as I can see, all of this only contributes to the defence of the weaker of 
the two claims . In order to pass critical judgment on Siewert’s argument, we 
must, at this point, disambiguate it, and consider whether the disambigua-
tion yields a sound argument that makes an interesting point .
If we interpret Siewert’s argument as based on the first reading, then 
Siewert basically argues that visual experiences are intentional, without there 
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needing to be an additional act of interpretation, or an interpretative judg-
ment, to confer intentionality upon them . There is no such job to be done, 
unlike in the case of linguistic expressions (Ibid .: 222) . If the argument is 
construed in this way, I have no objections to the first premise, but I wish to 
argue, for now, that there is an alternative to the view expressed in the second 
premise . (I will continue this critical discussion in the next section .)
Siewert argues for the second premise by inviting the readers to accept 
that it is clearly not the case that “the way it feels to have a sensation does not, 
any more than the shapes or sounds of language do, constrain the ‘interpreta-
tion’…” (Ibid .: 234) .5 He notes that linguistic expressions refer arbitrarily, 
based on an interpretation that assigns a reference to them . We are free to 
pick and choose the reference . It appears that we have no such freedom in 
regard to our visual experiences, which seem, by their nature, to be about a 
red, rather than a blue object, an X-shaped, rather than a Y-shaped object .
Siewert only clarifies the notion of interpretation by invoking the intui-
tive difference between a linguistic expression, on one hand, and assertion, 
belief, and vision, on the other (Ibid .: 192) . In essence, he invites us to agree 
that in one case there is room for a free choice of a referent and in the other 
case there is not . However, granting that there is no such unconstrained free 
choice in the case of visual experiences, it is still possible to consider whether 
we could speak of an interpretation here in the more general sense of an 
assignment of reference . As a matter of psychology, the assignment of refer-
ence might not be by free choice, it might be subject to constraints, and the 
person might not even be able to conceive of any alternative interpretations . 
This could be ruled out if we had a positive conception of how phenomenal 
features render visual experiences assessable for accuracy, as part of the very 
nature of visual experiences . However, Siewert never gives us a positive con-
ception of this “in virtue of” .
It seems to me that the burden of proof is on us here, rather than on 
Siewert . Clearly, people cannot freely pick and choose the reference of their 
visual experiences . If we do not accept that visual experiences are referential 
by their very nature, we need to have an account of how some non-referential 
feature places a constraint on how they can be interpreted . I will provide such 
an account in the next section, having introduced the relevant Husserlian 
ideas .
If we interpret Siewert’s argument in terms of the second reading of the 
notions of a phenomenal and an intentional feature, then Siewert is arguing 
that the phenomenal character of our visual experiences is identical with their 
5 This claim, viz ., that phenomenal features constrain their interpretation, is rather simi-
lar to the above supervenience claim, or a version thereof .
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intentional character .6 It seems to me that on this reading, Siewert’s second 
premise is unsupported, for two reasons .
The mainstream view is that visual experiences have a phenomenal 
character and intentional content, and these two kinds of properties are 
distinguished to address various philosophical concerns . Siewert, of course, 
pursues a philosophical approach that is particularly sensitive to first-person 
considerations (Ibid .: 187), while aiming to avoid excessive philosophical 
theorizing . We have learned that he shuns the notion of content because 
we have “too little pretheoretical notion of what ‘content’ is supposed to 
be…” (Ibid .: 188) . Siewert elsewhere regards this as largely a terminological 
point (Siewert 2002: 4 of 19), but it is not, if by eliminating the term we 
also invalidate the philosophical concerns that have led to its widespread use, 
thereby foregrounding first-person considerations and providing support for 
Siewert’s view . My first point is that Siewert has provided no argument for so 
privileging the “pretheoretical”, and the first-person perspective, over other 
philosophical considerations .
Suppose that Siewert holds the view that our account of visual experi-
ences should be developed entirely from the first-person perspective, or based 
on first-person warrant . But then, prima facie at least, his view would seem 
to be inconsistent . This is my second point . The putative first-personal view 
seems inconsistent, because it incorporates a conception of perceptual states 
as assessable for accuracy . Accuracy does not appear to be a first-person no-
tion .7 Rather, it straddles experience and reality, relating a first-person fact, 
concerning the first-person perspective, to a third-person fact, the way things 
6 This claim is criticized in Ludwig (2002) and Thomasson (2002) . Siewert replies to 
these criticisms in Siewert (2002) . I will pursue lines different from Thomasson’s and Lud-
wig’s . 
7 Yet, Horgan and Tienson write,
“[The] occurrent states in the phenomenal duplicate, by virtue of having the same phe-
nomenologically determined truth conditions as yours, are thereby subject to the same meth-
ods of accuracy assessment: for instance, you and your phenomenological duplicate might 
each experience turning around to see if the picture is still crooked . If it still appears crooked, 
you might then experience going through the tests mentioned above . The possibility of such 
tests is in some sense understood, if not explicitly phenomenologically given, in having the 
conscious belief that there is a picture hanging crooked behind oneself ” (Horgan and Tienson 
2002: 525) .
One natural reply to this is that phenomenal states have phenomenologically determined 
truth conditions and are subject to methods of accuracy assessment, provided that one has a 
conception of accuracy and regards the experience in light of it . Otherwise, turning around 
to see if the picture is still crooked, will not amount to a test for accuracy but to what Hus-
serl speaks of as “fulfillment”, i .e ., confirmation in the course of the harmonious unfolding 
of experience, without recourse to the idea of the experience in some way matching what we 
might call a thing in itself . 
13K . LAASIK: Consciousness and Intentionality: The Face of the Phenomena
really are . Siewert, it would seem, cannot dismiss third-person, theoretical 
considerations on the grounds that his is a purely first-person account .
That said, it is, of course, possible that Siewert does not aim to develop 
his view of visual experiences (based on the second reading) entirely from the 
first-person point of view, and that he is merely putting forward a view that 
enables him to address his philosophical concerns, rather than arguing that 
either these concerns take precedence over others, or that his view is better 
supported than others . However, if he is arguing for his views, then my objec-
tions cannot just be circumvented .
III
Thomas Szanto has recently argued that, on the Husserlian view, intentional-
ity is to be regarded in constitutive, rather than representational terms . I will 
use his ideas in discussing the difficulties with Siewert’s argument . I accept 
Szanto’s view, based on the arguments he provides, and will not attempt to 
critically evaluate it in the present paper .8 Rather, I will start by a brief exposi-
tion of his views, with a focus on the distinction between the two conceptions 
of intentionality . I would add that, in chapter 1 of his monograph, Szanto 
gives a critical overview of the contemporary debates about the relations be-
tween consciousness and intentionality, and he contrasts the mainstream ap-
proaches with Husserl’s, but he does not go on to use the Husserlian ideas to 
develop critical objections to views like Siewert’s . I believe my purposes to be 
complementary to Szanto’s .
In a chapter 1 of his monograph, Szanto describes the representational 
(or referential) approach, as one according to which mental representations 
that are internal to consciousness, stand for items that are essentially external 
to consciousness, and the relation between them is interpreted in naturalistic 
terms, as being one of extensional-referential determination and/or causal 
dependence (Szanto 2012: 45) . He primarily has in mind here certain in-
fluential representationalist views that have been developed with the aim of 
reductively naturalizing intentionality, raising, for us, the question of how 
generally the label “representationalism” is meant to apply . Helpfully, in con-
trasting this with the Husserlian conception, he quotes what he regards as an 
anti-representationalist statement by Husserl, thereby clarifying the matter,
[I]t makes no sense at all to speak of things as if they were simply there and need 
only to be seen . For this “simply being there” is a matter of certain experiences 
of a specific and changing structure, such as perception, imagination, memory, 
predication, etc .; and things are in them not as they might be in a case or con-
8 For a critical discussion, see Soldati (2014) .
14 Prolegomena 15 (1) 2016
tainer, rather, things constitute themselves in these experiences even though they 
are not to be found in them in the real [reellen] sense . For “things to be given” 
is for them to present themselves (to be represented) [vorgestellt sein] as such in 
these phenomena . And this does not mean that the things are once again there 
for themselves and then “send their representatives into consciousness .” […] 
Rather, things exist, and exist in appearance, and are themselves given by virtue 
of appearance… (Husserl 1999: 68)
A very general distinction is being made here by Husserl, providing a 
context for Szanto’s remarks on the representationalist naturalistic approaches 
in the analytic philosophy of mind . On one hand, we have a view on which 
mental states are directed to, or related to, external objects . On the other 
hand, we have a view on which objectivity (as presence) is conceived as an 
aspect of intentional experience .9 According to the first view, we start with 
some version of a dichotomy of the mind and the world, while based on the 
second view our starting point is intentional experience, as a unified whole . 
The first kind of view can, but need not be worked out in reductive, natural-
istic terms . It can, but need not be developed as a mediate, or indirect, view of 
intentionality, where representations are introduced as entities mediating be-
tween the mind and the world . It can be ontologically committed to the ex-
istence of representations as entities in the mind, or it can be non-committal 
in this regard . E .g ., Searle’s view of intentionality is ontologically non-com-
mittal about representations, but counts as representational (or referential), 
for Szanto, because it conceives of intentionality in terms of “conditions of 
satisfaction”, or what it would take for there to be a fit, or a match, between 
the mind and the world (Szanto 2012: 110–112) . The constitution of objec-
tivity, by contrast with such views, is rightly understood as the idea that the 
givenness of the object is conceived in terms of its persistence, or identity, in 
various acts of consciousness that can be directed to it (Ibid .: 54) .
Since, on the Husserlian approach, we are investigating intentional ex-
periences, as just described, the phenomenal features of experiences are not 
necessarily segregated from the objects of the experiences, but can form part 
of our conception of (the given) objectivity,
Phenomenality, in phenomenology’s sense, thus, does not describe a metainten-
tional property of consciousness, i .e ., a property that would accrue to entities 
(and especially to conscious events) beside, or would, so to speak, be “detach-
able” from, their intentional properties . It describes, rather, the specific (inten-
9 We are, indeed, painting with a very broad brush here . In contemporary debates over 
intentionality, a fundamental distinction is made between the representational and relational 
views of intentionality . We, however, are grouping these views together and distinguishing 
them from the Husserlian view . 
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tional) way of givenness, of the objectivities of consciousness, for the respective 
subject of an intentional consciousness-experience (Ibid .: 51) .10
In other words, the phenomenal should not be regarded as the subjective 
what-it-is-like .11 Rather, the object is conceived as phenomenal, as the “phe-
nomenon” (Ibid .: 50) . Moreover, Szanto argues that we have no conception 
of a pre-intentional phenomenal sphere, and Husserl’s discussion of the sen-
suous matter (hyle) needs to be understood in the context of the functioning 
of such sensuous matter, as part of the intentional experience, towards the 
givenness of objectivity .12 While we can, in a kind of provisional way, dif-
ferentiate between consciousness as object-directedness, and consciousness as 
phenomenal consciousness (or the what-it-is-like), on closer scrutiny the two 
conceptions will reveal themselves as expressing the same view (Ibid ., 55) .
For the purposes of this paper, I will simply accept Szanto’s central dis-
tinction between the representational and constitutive conceptions of inten-
tionality . While aspects of the way he elaborates some of the details, notably, 
the claim that there is no pre-intentional phenomenal sphere, seem, prima 
facie, contentious, I shall set aside such issues . Instead, let us return to the 
objections raised earlier against the two versions of Siewert’s argument, for 
further discussion . Concerning the version based on the first reading of “phe-
nomenal feature” and “intentional feature”, we have appealed to the possibil-
ity of interpretation under constraints . Based on the Husserlian distinction 
between two conceptions of intentionality, we can now elaborate this point . 
Since Siewert conceives of intentionality in terms of assessability for accuracy, 
it would be quite natural to assume that he, like Searle, is committed to a 
kind of representational account, drastically different from the Husserlian 
view . From the Husserlian perspective, it can be argued that it is “natural” 
and psychologically compelling to regard a visual experience as referring to 
a red, X-shaped object, rather than a blue, Y-shaped one, because an object 
is constituted in our visual experience as red and X-shaped . However, on our 
Husserlian conception, the idea of representation, or reference, as it has been 
10 “Phänomenalität im Sinne der Phänomenologie bezeichnet also keine metainten-
tionale Bewusstseinsegenschaft, das heisst keine Eigenschaft, die Entitäten (und insbesondere 
Bewusstseinsvorkommnissen) neben ihren intenonalen Eigenschaften zukommen würde oder 
von diesen gleichsam, ablösbar’ wäre . Sie bezeichnet vielmehr die spezifische (intentionale) Art 
und Weise der Gegebenheit von Bewusstseinsgegenständlichkeiten für ein jeweiliges Subjekt 
eines intentionalen Bewusstseinserlebnisses” (Szanto 2012: 51) .
11 Emiliano Trizio, too, has argued that accepting the nagelian conception is, from the 
Husserlian perspective, unacceptable – since to accept it “means to be situated, from the outset, 
in the natural attitude” (Trizio 2012: 6 of 15) .
12 See footnote 45, Szanto (2012: 52–53) . James Mensch discusses the constitutive func-
tioning of sensations, as providing a kind of functionalist account of consciousness (Mensch 2003: 
Ch . V) . Drawing upon Mensch’s ideas, Frank Steffen also discusses this view . See Steffen (2010) .
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sketched above, is not drawn from the experience itself, but is a construction 
put upon the experience . One can mistake presentation in experience for rep-
resentation, and therefore believe that visual experiences are intrinsically in-
tentional in the sense of the representational conception . In other words, the 
Husserlian account captures how we all have a sense of how objects present 
themselves in visual experience, and it also helps us understand how it can be 
quite natural for us to think that the visual experience picks out, or refers to, 
an external object .
To object to Siewert’s argument, as disambiguated based on the first read-
ing of “phenomenal feature” and “intentional feature”, we needed an account 
of how some non-referential feature places a constraint on how visual experi-
ences can be interpreted . But now we have such an account, viz ., involving 
the Husserlian constitutive conception of intentionality, providing an alter-
native to Siewert’s view . It seems to me that, in a very general way, we have 
seen that once one accepts the representationalist or the accuracy-based view 
of intentionality, the distinction between intrinsic and non-intrinsic inten-
tionality becomes rather tenuous . If we start with the dichotomy of subjective 
experience and the world, there will always be a need to somehow bridge the 
two, whether by naturalization or by interpretation . From this perspective, 
there does not seem to be a great deal of difference between views accord-
ing to which the act of interpretation is extrinsic to the visual experience, 
and views on which the content (or intentional character) of the experience 
“interprets” its phenomenal features . Contrast this with the Husserlian view, 
on which objectivity (the phenomenon!), viz ., as a system of full and empty 
givennesses, is conceived as an aspect of the intentional experience .
In regard to the second reading of “phenomenal feature” and “intentional 
feature”, we have argued that Siewert does not give us reason to accept that 
phenomenal features are intentional features . In other words, Siewert says 
that there is no distinction to be drawn between the phenomenal character 
and the intentional content of a visual experience, but many philosophers 
make such a distinction, and it seems legitimate . Siewert may regard the 
first-person perspective and first-person warrant as enjoying a privilege over 
other perspectives and considerations, yet the very idea of accuracy seems to 
place him beyond the purview of the first-person perspective . I believe that 
recourse to Szanto’s discussion of the constitutive vs . representational view 
has helped contextualize this criticism, and I hope that it may have thereby 
helped win over some readers to my critical point of view .
This brings me to the end of my criticisms of Siewert’s view . However, 
could we, in principle, also interpret Siewert’s views as consonant with the 
Husserlian, constitutive view of intentionality, and what would be the dialec-
tical upshot of doing so? To begin, we certainly would not be abandoning the 
spirit in which Siewert’s book is written, viz ., aiming to re-instate conscious-
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ness as an important philosophical topic, over and above a narrow concern 
with its naturalization . While it is natural to regard the accuracy-conditional 
view as a kind of ghostly, emptied-out residue of the modern philosophi-
cal tradition, with its dichotomies of mind vs . world, and subject vs . object 
– which, I believe, would place it with the representational conceptions, as 
conceived by Szanto – might we, perhaps, also try to view the accuracy-con-
ditional conception against the backdrop of Husserlian phenomenology? The 
idea that intentionality involves accuracy conditions would then need to be 
somehow clarified in terms of a Husserlian, constitutive account of the reality 
to which intentional states are directed, and of which they can be either true 
or false, either accurate or inaccurate .
However, I wish to make a more straightforward suggestion, viz ., that 
Siewert abandon his accuracy-conditional conception of (visual) intentional-
ity, and embrace the view that, on the constitutive account, appears the most 
compelling and natural, viz ., a conception of (visual) intentionality in terms 
not of accuracy conditions but fulfilment conditions, specifying what it would 
take to bring to presence aspects or parts of the experienced object, e .g ., as 
when I anticipate that the back side will look a certain way to me, if I turn the 
object around, or that its colour will look different if the lighting changes .13
Embracing the Husserlian view would have the consequence of under-
cutting the two objections to Siewert’s argument, viz ., the interpretation un-
der constraints objection and the point about the apparent inconsistency of 
Siewert’s first-personal stance . If we accept that visual contents are fulfilment 
conditions, it will help us understand how visual experiences have content 
in virtue of their phenomenal character, since the givenness of the object is 
accounted for in terms of series of harmonious appearances, involving phe-
nomenally contrasting full and empty givennesses . E .g ., when the back side 
of the apple is given emptily, in terms of my anticipations, the harmonious 
course of my experience will consist in its gradually coming into full view as 
I turn the apple around .
This view is part of a project that is pursued consistently from a first-
personal stance, viz ., Husserlian phenomenology . While it may well be that 
some other objections will prove difficult for the Husserlian approach, it will 
not sustain damage from the above two .
IV
Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional 
features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phe-
nomenal features . I have shown that this argument trades on an ambiguity, 
13 For my take on the Husserlian fulfillment-based view, see Laasik (2014, sect . III) .
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and faces objections on both available readings . I have drawn upon Thomas 
Szanto’s distinction between a constitutive and a representational conception 
of intentionality, to discuss the difficulties with Siewert’s arguments . An in-
terpretation of Siewert’s view in representational terms has, on one hand, ren-
dered my objections the more damaging . However, if we interpret or modify 
Siewert’s views, based on Husserlian phenomenology, it should be possible to 
address the main criticisms made in the present paper .
I regard the present discussion of Siewert’s view as my modest contribu-
tion to the current debates concerning the relationship between conscious-
ness and intentionality . As I have indicated in my footnote 2, Siewert’s book 
is seminal among the increasingly numerous texts arguing that we have phe-
nomenal intentionality . In my paper, I have discussed ways in which our 
critical assessment of this seminal text can informed by Husserlian considera-
tions, and how such considerations may ultimately help Siewert achieve his 
philosophical aims .14
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